"Explanations in Classical Genetics: A Model-Theoretic Account"

LORENZANO, PABLO

Oslo

Congreso; 2019 ISHPSSB Conference; 2019

International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB)

The aimof this communication is to analyze the kind of explanations usually given inClassical Genetics (see, e.g., Sinnott & Dunn 1925). Explanations inbiology have intriguing aspects to both biologists and philosophers (see, e.g.,Braillard & Malaterre 2015).First, wesummarize two main aspects discussed in the literature with regard thepeculiarities, or even oddities, of biological explanations in general and ofClassical Genetics in particular, namely, (1) whether biological laws exist,and (2) whether causation plays a specific explanatory role in biology. Next,paradigmatic examples of explanations in Classical Genetics will be presentedin the traditional format of explanations as summarized by arguments (Hempel& Oppenheim 1948).Later on,the nature of these explanations will be discussed by using explanations inanother area of science, namely, Classical Mechanics. Toclarify the situation, and to carry out an analysis of explanations in ClassicalGenetics, we introduce some meta-theoretical tools provided by Sneedianstructuralism (Balzer, Moulines & Sneed 1987), in particular those oftheory-net, fundamental law or guiding principle, specialization, and speciallaws. We then applied these tools to Classical Genetics. In this application, ClassicalGenetics? fundamental law/guiding principle will be made explicit.In orderto to make more transparent the ontological commitments of Classical Genetics(some of which would play a causal role; see, e.g., Waters 2007, Woodward 2010),paradigmatic explanations in Classical Genetics will then be presented in amodel-theoretic, structuralist format as ampliative embeddingsinto nomic patterns within theory-nets (Bartelborth 1996, Díez 2014, Forge2002). Finally, weconclude with a discussion of the presented analysis showing how it sheds lightto the aforementioned intriguing aspects of biological and genetic explanations.ReferencesBalzer, W., Moulines, C.U. and J.Sneed (1987), An Architectonic forScience. The Structuralist Program, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987.Braillard, P.-A. and C. Malaterre(eds.) (2015), Explanation in Biology: AnEnquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences,Netherlands: Springer.Bartelborth, T. (1996), "Scientific Explanation", in Balzer, W. and C.U. Moulines (eds.), StructuralistTheory of Science. Focal Issues, New Results, Berlin/New York: Walter deGruyter, pp. 23-43.Díez, J.A. (2014), "Scientificw-Explanation as Ampliative, Specialized Embedding: A Neo-Hempelian Account", Erkenntnis79(8): 1413-1443.Forge, J. (2002), "Reflections onStructuralism and Scientific Explanation", Synthese 130: 109-121.Hempel,C.G. and P. Oppenheim (1948), "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", Philosophyof Science 15: 135-175.Sinnot, E.W. and L.C. Dunn (1925), Principles of Genetics: An Elementary Text,with Problems, New York: McGraw-Hill, 2nd ed. 1932, 3rded. 1939.Woodward, J. (2010), "Causationin Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation", Biology & Philosophy 25(3): 287-318.Waters, K,(2007), "Causes that Make a Difference", Journalof Philosophy CIV: 551-579.