Objetividad como ausencia de toda perspectiva

DANIEL ENRIQUE KALPOKAS

REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA

Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Lugar: Madrid; Año: 2009 vol. 34 p. 1 - 19

0034-8244

This paper examines the concept of objectivity as a point of view from nowhere. This sense of objectivity is present (among others) in Williams's works (particularly in its notion of absolute conception of reality). The structure of the paper is the following: first, Williams´ physicalist program is described. Secondly, the article presents some objections to Williams´ physicalism. Thirdly, some reasons are given against the notion of objectivity as a point of view from nowhere in order to defend Putnam's conceptual pluralism. Finally, the paper defends the compatibility between conceptual pluralism and the idea of convergence in a final opinion. As a consequence of that, I conclude that objectivity depends on the particular vocabularies employed.