Peirce, Wittgenstein y Davidson: coincidencias anti-escépticas

DANIEL ENRIQUE KALPOKAS

Areté. Revista de Filosofía

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú

Lugar: Lima; Año: 2008 vol. XX p. 217 - 232

1016-913X

This paper shows some similarities among Peirce´s, Wittgenstein´s and Davidson´s answers to skepticism. In each case, the response to Cartesian skepticism consists in pointing out the contradictory character of  the skeptical doubt in itself. More specifically, those philosophers agree on the following points: (i) in order to face the challenge of skepticism we have to examine its bases without conceding the terms of the challenge; (ii) the skeptic cannot doubt without assuming some propositional contents as true. In this sense, the skeptics commits performative contradiction; (iii) in his challenge, the skeptic omits the practical dimension of language and knowledge. That is the source of his difficulties.