Realismo, relatividad conceptual e independencia ontológica

DANIEL ENRIQUE KALPOKAS

Analítica

Lugar: Lima, Perú; Año: 2007 p. 141 - 166

1996-1464

This paper examines Putnam?s works in order to establish if Putnam?s different realisms explain consistently the ontological independence of the world. The main thesis supported here is that this independence is not appropriately understood neither by Putnam?s internal realism nor by his natural realism. This is because Putnam intends to articulate realism with conceptual relativity in a wrong way. As a consequence of these criticisms, it is stated that metaphysical realism is right to point out the ontological independence of reality. That implies, on the one hand, that we should assume that the world consists in a totality of objects, properties and facts which are  independent of our conceptual schemes; and, on the other hand, that correct but incompatible schemes have to share the same ontology.  Key words: metaphysical realism, internal realism, natural realism, Putnam, ontological independence, conceptual relativity.