Perceiving Mental States: Co-presence and Constitution

DANIEL KALPOKAS

FILOSOFIA UNISINOS

Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos

Año: 2017 vol. 18 p. 87 - 97

1519-5023

Recently, several philosophers have called attention to the idea that there are occasions on which we can perceive (at least some) mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals in this direction: the co-presence thesis (Smith, 2010) and the hybrid model (Krueger & Overgaard, 2012). We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts which allows us to avoid such objections. Broadly stated, our idea is that by perceiving other people?s behaviors we also perceive their mental states because behaviors co-present some features of the latter, and that this perception of others? minds is direct and immediate because behavior is a constitutive part of the mental states in question.Key Words: mindreading, hybrid model, direct perception of other minds, co-presence thesis.