Interest Mobilization

BRACHET, VIVIANE; ALONSO, GUILLERMO V. AND URIBE, MÓNICA

Toronto

Congreso; Congreso 2010 de la Latin American Studies Association; 2010

Latin American Studies Association

Interest group activation is examined comparatively in the context of the political processes of adoption of three major welfare reforms in the 1990s, respectively pension reform in Argentina and Mexico, and public health reform in Colombia, in order to assess the degree to which they followed democratic procedures. The events marking these processes are selected on the basis of six hypotheses: adoption resulted from the free interplay of parliamentary coalitions; societal interest groups influenced parliamentary debates; the Executive mediated between power groups rather than acted as a power group in its own right; international credit agencies have pressured debtor countries into carrying out the reforms; private health care providers, insurance, banking and pharmaceutical interests exerted pressures on government to carry out the reforms; and technocrats who launched the reforms were linked to private interests. The paper concludes that the political processes through which the three reforms were adopted have been fairly democratic, although the old corporatist systems in Argentina and Mexico, and the old exclusionary liberal party in Colombia were indispensable back-ups to ensure parliamentary support. The weakness of alternatives to the governmental projects, rather than stem from behind the scene maneuvering and pressuring by interest or power groups, are attributed to the weakness of opposition parties in countries that have barely begun to practice politics in multi-party systems. It also stems from the urgency, as perceived by the Executive branches and their allies, to demonstrate to the globalized world that their country is a safe place in which to invest. political processes of adoption of three major welfare reforms in the 1990s, respectively pension reform in Argentina and Mexico, and public health reform in Colombia, in order to assess the degree to which they followed democratic procedures. The events marking these processes are selected on the basis of six hypotheses: adoption resulted from the free interplay of parliamentary coalitions; societal interest groups influenced parliamentary debates; the Executive mediated between power groups rather than acted as a power group in its own right; international credit agencies have pressured debtor countries into carrying out the reforms; private health care providers, insurance, banking and pharmaceutical interests exerted pressures on government to carry out the reforms; and technocrats who launched the reforms were linked to private interests. The paper concludes that the political processes through which the three reforms were adopted have been fairly democratic, although the old corporatist systems in Argentina and Mexico, and the old exclusionary liberal party in Colombia were indispensable back-ups to ensure parliamentary support. The weakness of alternatives to the governmental projects, rather than stem from behind the scene maneuvering and pressuring by interest or power groups, are attributed to the weakness of opposition parties in countries that have barely begun to practice politics in multi-party systems. It also stems from the urgency, as perceived by the Executive branches and their allies, to demonstrate to the globalized world that their country is a safe place in which to invest. political processes of adoption of three major welfare reforms in the 1990s, respectively pension reform in Argentina and Mexico, and public health reform in Colombia, in order to assess the degree to which they followed democratic procedures. The events marking these processes are selected on the basis of six hypotheses: adoption resulted from the free interplay of parliamentary coalitions; societal interest groups influenced parliamentary debates; the Executive mediated between power groups rather than acted as a power group in its own right; international credit agencies have pressured debtor countries into carrying out the reforms; private health care providers, insurance, banking and pharmaceutical interests exerted pressures on government to carry out the reforms; and technocrats who launched the reforms were linked to private interests. The paper concludes that the political processes through which the three reforms were adopted have been fairly democratic, although the old corporatist systems in Argentina and Mexico, and the old exclusionary liberal party in Colombia were indispensable back-ups to ensure parliamentary support. The weakness of alternatives to the governmental projects, rather than stem from behind the scene maneuvering and pressuring by interest or power groups, are attributed to the weakness of opposition parties in countries that have barely begun to practice politics in multi-party systems. It also stems from the urgency, as perceived by the Executive branches and their allies, to demonstrate to the globalized world that their country is a safe place in which to invest. Interest group activation is examined comparatively in the context of the political processes of adoption of three major welfare reforms in the 1990s, respectively pension reform in Argentina and Mexico, and public health reform in Colombia, in order to assess the degree to which they followed democratic procedures. The events marking these processes are selected on the basis of six hypotheses: adoption resulted from the free interplay of parliamentary coalitions; societal interest groups influenced parliamentary debates; the Executive mediated between power groups rather than acted as a power group in its own right; international credit agencies have pressured debtor countries into carrying out the reforms; private health care providers, insurance, banking and pharmaceutical interests exerted pressures on government to carry out the reforms; and technocrats who launched the reforms were linked to private interests. The paper concludes that the political processes through which the three reforms were adopted have been fairly democratic, although the old corporatist systems in Argentina and Mexico, and the old exclusionary liberal party in Colombia were indispensable back-ups to ensure parliamentary support. The weakness of alternatives to the governmental projects, rather than stem from behind the scene maneuvering and pressuring by interest or power groups, are attributed to the weakness of opposition parties in countries that have barely begun to practice politics in multi-party systems. It also stems from the urgency, as perceived by the Executive branches and their allies, to demonstrate to the globalized world that their country is a safe place in which to invest.