LA FENOMENOLOGÍA DE M. MERLEAU-PONTY Y UNA CRÍTICA A LA NOCIÓN DE REPRESENTACIÓN

BATTÁN HORENSTEIN, ARIELA

Representaciones

Sirca Publicaciones Académicas

Lugar: Córdoba; Año: 2011

1669-8401

I will consider the criticism that Merleau-Ponty addresses to the notion of representation. This criticism is assumed later by two contemporary philosophers, one of them is H. Dreyfus, and the other is Ch. Taylor. As regards Dreyfus, the critical position held by Merleau-Ponty is used in order to discuss some suppositions about skill acquisition postulated by the cognitive perspective in philosophy of mind. Moreover, Taylor uses the merleau-pontian criticism to characterize and analyze what he calls ?meditational epistemology?. Considering the importance and the current vitality of the merleau-pontian thought I will review and contextualize some notions which constitute the conceptual legacy assumed by Dreyfus and Taylor (concepts like ?intentional arc?, ?maximal grip?, ?sedimentation?, ?practognose?, for example). The main goal of this paper consists on showing what Merleau-Ponty offers in his works which is more than what philosophers can imagine for founding a criticism to the presupposes of representational epistemology.