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I have argued that in the first half of H6 (1045a7-25) Aristotle presents us with a problem about the unity of definition, for which he already has a solution in Z12. The model for that solution in Z12 is Division properly understood. This means, among other things, no longer thinking about the parts of a definition as independent. A key of that model is that in the set {G, Du} all the parts required to ground the unity of form and definition are included; a second key is that Du is like a concentrate involving the whole, and so Aristotle can claim for it the definitional force of being the form and the substance of the species (Z12.1038a25-26). The motivation that Aristotle may have for still presenting in H6 the difficulty of unity for definitions in particular is, as suggested, just to argue that there is a problematic way of dealing with compounds, which is anchored into the Platonic-oriented model. This is the model he discards in the closing lines of the first half of H6 by saying that, if we take the parts in a definition as independent, then man will not be one but many, namely, animal and two-footed (1045a20)which he understands as Animal itself and Two-Footed itself (1045a15-17).Now in H6, he briefly steps back from this problem by saying that there will be no longer a difficulty if one part (which cannot be but the genus) is taken as matter and in potentiality, and the other (which cannot be but the differentia) is form and in actuality (1045a23-24). In paraphrasing matter and form using modal terms (potentiality and actuality respectively) he goes beyond the vocabulary used in Z12 for addressing that same issuenamely, the unity of divisional definition and form. The modal vocabulary, in fact, is an innovation of H, which has on its back the hylomorphich theory of Z17. All this is alien to Z12 just because Aristotle does not set up any discussion about hylomorphism in this chapter. In H6, Aristotle does not take position explicitly about his achievements in Z12, although, as I have suggested, the rapid solution to the problem of unity of definition in H6 can hardly be understood without the much more detailed presentation of that same solution in Z12. Consider the following in favor of this suggestion.We may think that calling the genus matter in H6.1045a23 makes clear that Aristotle is thinking about the same classification of that highest part of a definition in Z12.1038a6. The other part of the definition, i.e. the differentia, is said to be form in H6, and this comes very close what we find in Z12.1038a25-26: the single and last differentia is the form and the substance. So we are entitled to think that in H6 Aristotle endorses his previous solution carried out with much more detail in Z12. Now, if Z12 really backs H6?s brief solution, and if we further agree that the new modal vocabularywhich sticks matter to potentiality and form to actualityis introduced in H6.1045a23-24 without further comments, then we are justified to think that in H6 Aristotle continues operating with his old Division Model, which he has enriched or refined by means of the new modal distinctions, which aptly applies to the hylomorphic issues he has been considering over the previous chapters of book H. If there is a refinement, there must be something new; but if it is a true refinement of some old model, then the model as such keeps priority. In sum, what grounds the unity of definition is not mainly that genus is now mainly explained as potentiality and differentiae as actuality, but it must be rather the specifying procedure that is the main feature of Aristotle?s own interpretation of the method of division, as we have seen in Z12. So until he deals with the issue of definition in H6, I submit, the solution is provided by the logical basis of the good old Division Model.But in the second half of H6 (1045a25ff), Aristotle suggests that the same difficulty concerning unity can be raised about a different issue: material substance (the first example for that is the spherical bronze, 1045a26). Now, again, Aristotle?s solution to this second issue in H6 is similarly brief. It is introduced without too much explanation in two parallel brief sections: 1045a29-33 and 1045b17-22. There, he makes explicit use of the modal vocabulary, in parallel to the first use of it for definition in 1045a23-25, and he also matches matter and potentiality, on the one hand, and form and actuality, on the other. But in the case of material substance the explanatory role of the modal terms seems to outweigh the mere classification of bronze as matter and sphere as form, since it is clear enough that such parts cannot be but matter and form. So what plays an explanatory role in the case of definitionnamely, classifying genus as matter and differentia as formcan hardly be just repeated in H6 for, on the contrary, this is what must be explained. Therefore, the difficulty raised in H6 can be described as the problem of explaining how can be sensible matter and form a unity in making up a single hylomorphic compound. As in Z12 for species like man, the unity of hylomorphic compounds is assumed in H6; but the goal of both chapters is ultimately to ground that assumption.The specific way in which the unity of form-matter relationship is grounded in H6 is by denying that there is an additional bond or a further cause besides matter and form:There will no longer seem to be a difficulty, because the one is matter and the other shape. Which is then the cause of this, namely, of what is in potentiality being in actualitybesides the maker in the things that are subjected to generation? For of sphere in potentiality being a sphere in actuality there is no other cause, but this was what it is for each of them. (1045a29-33). I have argued that, in parallel to the Platonic-oriented interpretation of divisional definition, which is rejected in the first half of H6, Aristotle also rejects here a model that drives us to look for an additional bond, an external cause, different both from matter and form. Which the model for the unity of form and matter in compounds should be is explained in H6 by resorting to two things: (i) the essence of each of them (in the passage quoted above) (τοῦτ´ ἦν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκατέρῳ, 1045a33), and (ii) the explanation of the proximate matter as potential and of form as actual later in 1045b18-19 (ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ). Now, (i) and (ii) must be seen, I submit, as two complementary features of the same theory. In (i) it is argued that nothing else is needed but what the matter and the form are in order to ground the unity of form and matter. In turn, this requires thinking of matter in terms that can be best described as potentiality, as Aristotle has it in Θ7.1048b37-1049a18: the matter of human can only be that stuff which, through its own principle, already is such a thing, and so nothing prevents in that stuff the generation of a thing of this kind, nor is there anything which must be added or taken away or changed?, so only that stuff in this state is potentially a thing of that kindas the matter of a human being. On the other hand, the form is already actual, and about it, it needs only to be said that if informs the matter. In (ii), it is argued that the potential stuff in question is the proximate matter (ἐσχάτη ὕλη). At that point, the model drawn for definition in Z12 proves to be useful since a proximate matter can only be obtained by way of specification or differentiation of the lower-level matters, as it is also suggested in Θ7: earth must be further differentiated, and also seed in order to get the proximate matter of human being. In sum, the matter which is the proximate one and it is one and the same with the form can be explained by means of the model used to interpret the unity of definitions. So analogously to the ultimate differentia, which is already the form, the proximate stuff is already one and the same with the formbut still, the one in potentiality, and the other in actuality, a modal distinction which, however, does not prevent matter and form being one in a way (τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕν πώς ἐστιν, 1045b20-21).

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