Aristóteles sobre el primer motor como pensamiento activo en Metaf. XII 9

FABIAN MIE

Ciudad de México

Taller; 17 Taller de Filosofia Antigua; 2023

Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas-UNAM. México

Aristotle claims in Met. Λ6-9 that (1) there is a prime mover (Λ6-7), and that (2) this substance is unmoved and an intellect (Λ7) which, in a way, (2a) is the same as the intelligible (1072b21), and (2b) it is active or just active thinking (not the exercise of a capacity or the actualization of a potentiality). In a climax of Λ9 (1074b33-35), such active feature seems to be explained by a peculiar reflexive character of the divine thinking, which is thinking of thinking. Besides many particular problems with the claims and the arguments of Λ6-7 and 9, a common view on these chapters states that the conception of nous (intellect or thought) in Λ9 disregards especially the energeia (actuality or activity) feature, which is prominent in Λ6-7. With this, the causal role of the prime mover regarding the heavens, which is central to these two chapters, would be left out of the theory of intellect in Λ9. Thus, the problem of the relationship between Λ6-7 and 9, which were often thought to be incompatible or explainable as doublets (of which Λ9 would be an older version working with a more rudimentary model of nous or confined to be an appendix of Λ7), revolves around explaining how the prime mover’s peculiar causality as the unmoved mover of the heavens can be related to its being essentially active thinking and thinking of itself. This is the main problem I aim to address here. I will focus on an examination of the argument of these chapters, and mainly on Λ9. My thesis will be that, if we make clear that the thinking of thinking does not deprive the divine thinking of a substantive content, beyond the difficulty to determine the object of the divine thinking, we will be in a position to better understand the relationship between Λ9 and 7 as well as the prime mover’s specific causality as the object of thought (and desire) (1072a26). If so, it can be made plausible that Λ9 works together with Λ6-7 on the same plan, and that the three chapters are complementary reflections that feature in a coherent theory of the divine intellect crowing the argument of the book.