Strong Hylomorphism and Primary Material Parts in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z 10-11

FABIAN MIE

Munich

Workshop; 3er LMU-Berkeley Workshop: Aristotelian Metaphysics; 2015

Ludwig Maximilians Universität München

An overview shows that this chapter is divided into two halves, each of them reaches about one and a half page (first half: 1034b20-1035b3; second half: 1035b3-1036a25). The first half sets the main question up concerning both the parts-whole-relationship and the definition. After having shown that, contrary to the expectations, some parts are not included in their wholes (in the required sense), Aristotle urges us to distinguish different kinds of parts, mainly: parts of the form (formal parts) and parts of the hylomorphic compound (the form plus the matter). A main tool in Aristotle?s analysis is the priority-posteriority-distinction. In the first half of the chapter, Aristotle seems to go straight ahead with a clear-cut distinction between both kind of parts formal and material parts; a main result of this straight-line argumentation is that forms includes formal parts solely; and, in addition, that matter is only a part of the compound. It should be noted that the question as to what is the proper object of definition is not explicitly raised in the chapter; and therefore it is not plainly asked whether, besides the forms which are the natural candidates for definition, also hylomorphic (or material or sensible) compounds are definable. However, this topic is somehow inherited from Z 4-6?s discussion about essence and definition, and it is handed down to Z 10-11. As such, the question about the object of definition will prove to be an important source of controversy in the interpretation of Z 10-11.In the second half of the chapter there is a sort of innovation, which, however, should not be seen as Aristotle straying off the track. This second half promise to take up the issue again, and to tell the truth more clearly. If we consider that the priority-posteriority-analysis is much more prominent in the second than in the first half, we could guess that this is the tool Aristotle wants to apply in order to clarify the issue.Aristotle draws again the distinction between prior and posterior parts, but, then, interestingly enough, he comes to note that there are some material parts which are neither prior nor posterior to the combined whole, because they are the first material parts in which a form is realized. As to the definition, I claim that this imply that those first material parts are parts of the essence of the compound, and hence they should be included in a correct definition. The crucial passage is 1035b25-27, where Aristotle briefly explains that those parts are simultaneous to the combined whole. In the remaining section of Z 10, Aristotle comes back to his clear-cut-distinction between formal and material parts. This fact alone seems to indicate that the case of the simultaneous parts should be located within the framework of the theory I mean, not outside, as if this case were an exception or a break; a theory which makes room for the formal parts of a form, the material parts of a compound, and some forms I suggest to single them out as ?natural forms? which require some specific matter. Thus, I submit, the claim that matter is included in the definition of the essence only holds for natural forms, but no less than that. That is the core tenet of what I propose to call strong hylomorphism.