Aristotle's Metaphysics H 3: Form as actuality and the compositionality-condition for essence and definition

FABIAN MIE

Santiago de Chile

Conferencia; Conferencia en el Grupo Andino de Estudios Helenicos - Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad de los Andes, Chile; 2014

Universidad de los Andes, Chile

Although definition governs the discussion of H 2, its brief and somewhat apathetic conclusion does not collect this topic. It seems clear to me that Aristotle sees the discussion on definition in this wide context as if it were subordinate to the main discussion about substance and its ranking regarding the domain of sensible compounds. The leading issue continues to be that of Z 17, namely the role of form as metaphysical cause of sensible substances. The discussion on definition is subordinated to that dominant issue, but it is nonetheless relevant for it due to the close link between substance, essence and definition, as it was already established in Z 4. H 3?which is a sequel of H 2?pursues the subordinate discussion on definition, and it carries it out in order to chiefly clarify some remaining problems about the right way to build up the definition of sensible compound substances. The most important argumentation of this chapter deals with the mistake arising from some misconception about the role form and matter truly play in definition. This argument starts at 1043b5; it uses the main example?the syllable?also given at the end of Z 17 (1041b11ff.) to clarify (in Z 17) the role of the form as an irreducible cause of unity of the sensible compounds. I wll comment on H 3, section by section, aiming to clarify the structure and the argument of this complex chapter as well as to examine its meaning for the programme Aristotle started up in Z 17.