Dialéctica y ciencia en Aristóteles

FABIAN MIE

Signos Filosóficos

Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapala

Lugar: México, D.F.; Año: 2009 vol. 21 p. 9 - 42

1665-1324

Since the last decades the interpretation of Aristotle's methodology introduced several important changes in the foundationalism which had been traditionally credit to aristotelian epistemology. As a consequence of these changes, however, dialectic assumed a prevailing role in scientific practice, which deprived science from the required empirical content in its own basis. Focusing on the role of dialectic, I am aiming here to present, firstly, an approach to some difficulties which arise from the present prevailing interpretation of aristotelian epistemology. Secondly, I am trying to solve some of these difficulties determining the actual epistemological contribution of beliefs to the conceptual configuration of the empirical basis of science.