EMPIRISMO, CONOCIMIENTO PREVIO E INDUCCIÓN EN ARISTOTELES, ANALÍTICOS SEGUNDOS A 1

FABIÁN MIÉ

ELENCHOS (NAPOLI)

BIBLIOPOLIS

Lugar: ROMA/NAPOLI; Año: 2010 vol. XXXI p. 243 - 284

0392-7342

I reconstruct Aristotle?s epistemology and scientific methodology avoiding some problems which, in my opinion, are attributed to them from inadequate interpretations in terms of foundationalism or coherentism. On the contrary, I credit Aristotle with a hybrid concept of empiricism in which our knowledge is made possible through the integration of two different but cooperative factors: observations and beliefs. By clarifying the implications of Aristotle?s concept of experience and the basis for the elaboration of scientific knowledge, I try to give an alternative account of Aristotle?s vindication of a positive use of dialectic in science, as well as to show that an integration between dialectical examination of beliefs and scientific analysis of facts is possible and it also gives a plausible methodological image of Aristotle?s theory. According to my proposal, some opinions play a conceptual role in the empirical basis of knowledge. But, for Aristotle, this does not amount to any more than a kind of knowledge of the facts, not being equivalent to a scientific knowledge of the causes. Finally, I try to show that within this complex epistemological framework Aristotle?s use of induction could also be given an adequate explanation.