SUSTANCIA E INDIVIDUACION EN EL ORGANON DE ARISTOTELES

FABIAN MIE

REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE FILOSOFíA

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES FILOSÓFICAS

Lugar: Buenos Aires; Año: 2013 vol. 39 p. 151 - 185

0325-0725

My main goal is to explain that the substantial terms fixe the reference to an object, and to show that this expression is the principium individuationis, within the Aristotelian Organon. The paper works out two main theses: (1) Aristotle may be ascribed a descriptive theory of reference in which the essential properties included in the definition constitute sufficient conditions for referring to an object, provided that in the context the substantial terms are used to individualize. (2) Substantial individuals are justifiably included at the bottom of the ontology in the Categories by virtue of their being the objects of reference, and also by virtue of their role as ultimate subjects of predication.