The partial (but relevant) truth of the doctrine of the double effect

EDUARDO RIVERA LÓPEZ

Barcelona

Conferencia; Conferencia en el Area de Filosofía del Derecho; 2012

Universidad Pompeu Fabra

Although the discussions around DDE are full of subtleties, I think that, at least on some dimensions, there is less than sufficient precision about the content of DDE. Therefore, we cannot simply endorse of reject DDE. Different versions of DDE can have different degrees of plausibility. Two distinctions are crucial. First, we have to distinguish between epistemically idealized and non-idealized (realistic) scenarios. Second, we have to distinguish versions of DDE that make a ceteris paribus comparison between (roughly speaking) intentional and non-intentional outcomes, from versions that either make a comparison that is not ceteris paribus or are non-comparative. These clarifying and classificatory tasks are accomplished in sections II and III.1. Then I defend the following claims (I present these claims in a preliminary way, acknowledging that they are still obscure). First, in an idealized world, ceteris paribus versions of DDE might well be plausible (section III.2). Second, we cannot transfer such plausibility to stronger versions of DDE (non-ceteris paribus and non-comparative versions) (section III.3). Finally, in a non-idealized world, a strong version of DDE is plausible, but for different reasons. The argument for this last claim combines the reasons for defending ceteris paribus versions of DDE in idealized circumstances with an argument about how to proceed when we face hard choices under ineradicable uncertainty (section IV).