Rationing Health Care and the Role of the ‘Acute Principle’

EDUARDO RIVERA LÓPEZ

Perspectives in Moral Science. Contributions from Philosophy, Economics, and Politics in Honour of Hartmut Kliemt

Frankfurt School Verlag

Lugar: Frankfurt am Main; Año: 2009; p. 431 - 439

In several works, Hartmut Kliemt has developed an original account on the necessity of rationing health care and on how a rationing policy should be carried out. While I agree on several important points of that view, there is one important aspect of his account that I do not find plausible: his claim that the so-called “acute principle” (a principle that gives absolute preeminence to rescuing identified lives from dying) should be one of the basic criteria to carry out a rationing policy in a liberal state. After explaining Kliemt’s view on rationing health care and, more specifically, the foundations of the acute principle, I argue that the acute principle is not supported by our basic moral intuitions. I then apply the previous argument to the case of rationing, arguing for the necessity of a compromise among intuitions supporting the acute principle and other moral intuitions. Finally, I try to show that a feasible system of public health care services is conceivable. In doing so, I make use, with some relevant modifications, of Kliemt’s own ideas.