Use and Misuse of Examples in Normartive Ethics

EDUARDO RIVERA LÓPEZ

Journal of Value Inquiry

Springer

Año: 2005 vol. 39 p. 115 - 125

0022-5363

The use of hypothetical examples is a common tool in normative ethics. They are often provided to test arguments or even whole views against our moral intuitions. My aim in this paper is twofold. My general aim is methodological and can be interpreted as a recommendation for caution when using examples to test moral theories. More specifically, I wish to show that some arguments against act-consequentialism and in favor of the doctrine of the double effect built on these kinds of examples are misconstrued so that they do not achieve the expected goal of being a genuine test for these theories. I claim that the main reason why examples often fail to accomplish that goal is that they cancel out some commonsensical assumptions that nonetheless influence our intuitive reaction. The upshot is, therefore, deeply misleading.