Operationalizing Sen´s capability approach by some Aristotelian principles

RICARDO FERNANDO CRESPO

Buenos Aires

Jornada; XIV Jornadas de Epistemología de las Ciencias Económicas; 2008

UBA

A concern among scholars has arisen about the operationality of Sen?s CA. In this paper I have provided several arguments for this lack of operationality. They might be summarized in the inexact or ?vague? character of practical reason, the capacity that lies behind the whole CA. In Politics II, 6, Aristotle complains about the too vague character of Plato?s criterion of determination of the ideal amount of property in the cities: an amount ?sufficient for a good life: this is too general? [kathólou mallon]. Thus Aristotle wonders ?whether it is not better to determine it in a different ?that is to say, a more definite? way than Plato? (Politics II 6 1265a 28-32). In Nicomachean Ethics I, 7, Aristotle introduces the ergon argument also by complaining: ?Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired? (1097b 22-24). That is, Aristotle is conscious of the need of a more specific definition of the goods that are to be sought and of happiness. In this paper, in line with the previous quotations, I will try to offer a determined definition of the specific goods that the government should provide to the citizens. It is a task similar to Nussbaum´s and other scholars? lists that I will develop highly relying on Aristotle?s ideas. Economists are not used to practical reasoning. We (politicians and philosophers) should provide them with concrete indications.