Reciprocity and practical comparability

RICARDO F. CRESPO

Verbania (Italia)

Congreso; Reciprocity: Theories and Facts; 2007

Universidad de Milano Biccoca

As characterized by Fehr and Gachter (2000), “reciprocity means that in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self interest model.” According to S. Zamagni, reciprocity entails deep relational aspects. A may reciprocate B in a way that is not comparable to economic exchange. A would keep certain equilibrium in reciprocating. However, reciprocity does not require this equilibrium to be necessarily exact; it is often overabundant. In addition, reciprocity may be fulfilled by returning something of a different kind that may be heterogeneous, incommensurable and even incomparable with the thing received. Sometimes it means that A gives to B with the expectation that B will give something to C, and that the chain will go on, and in some way finally return to A. This does not occur always or necessarily. The reason of this uneven response of reciprocity is that in these situations an exchange of means is not only in play, but also the ends of the persons are. Hence, the consideration of reciprocity in economics is in line with the considerations of ends in economics, recently rehabilitated by the capabilities approaches and the theories of happiness. This paper firstly endeavours to summarise a variety of arguments for a reconsideration of ends in economics. This line of enquiry hints at a considerable challenge to economic science. The logical structure of the rationality of ends (practical rationality) differs from the one of means (instrumental rationality). The paper intends secondly to explain the differences between both rationalities and some of the consequences of incorporating this new emphasis on ends. Practical rationality harmonizes the complex set of constitutive ends in order to achieve a plan. This plan, however, is not perfectly designed: people must deal with the future, the complexity and the singularity of situations. All these conditions turn plans incomplete, uncertain, and underspecified. Human time, rationality and freedom open the practical realm. Consequently, the relation among these elements (different levels of ends and means) is dynamic involving shifting elements. Notwithstanding, there is a general unspecified final end and a preliminary plan or draught of components of the yearned happy life: material conditions, family-life, friendship, social-life, professional development, culture, art, religion, political and economic freedom, among others. These ends are simultaneously sought in themselves and as means to reach a final end. The instrumental character of these ends and of means should not be confused. Ends are not interchangeable conditions but constitutive parts that are also valuable in themselves. A key resulting difference between both logics and rationalities – i.e. instrumental and practical rationalities – lies in the problem of incommensurability and of sometimes even incomparability of ends which emerges in the second kind of rationality. This problem that will thirdly be tackled in the paper turns illegitimate the use of maximization in the realm of ends. I hence propose that there is a possible way to overcome this problem, different from the one that an economist might have instinctively adopted. In such cases, making a decision should depend on practical comparability, not on the commensuration of ends: the result is not exact but it is the only feasible and sensible one sometimes. In addition, this procedure is not irrational.             The paper will finally sustain that practical comparability allows for incommensurable and incomparable fair reciprocation.