?Strategy-proof and Bribe-proof rules in the Division Problem?.

NEME ALEJANDRO

San Luis Potosí. México.

Congreso; Primer encuentro Potosino de Teoría de Juegos.; 2002

Universidad San Luis Potosí

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of nagents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to beallocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresenttheir preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtains a weakly preferredshare and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterizeall bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonicrules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà et al. [Barberà, S.,Jackson, M., Neme, A., 1997. Strategy-proof allotment rules. Games Econ. Behav. 18, 1?21]