Single Agents and the set of Many-to-one stable matching

MARTINEZ R. MASSÓ J. NEME A. AND OVIEDO J.

Journal of Economic Theory

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.

Año: 2000 vol. 91 p. 91 - 105

0022-0531

Some properties of the set of many-to-one stable matchings when firms have responsive preferences and quotas are not necessarily true when firms preferences are substitutable. In particular, we exhibit examples in which firms have substitutable preferences but firms and workers may be "single" in one stable matching but matched in another one. We identify a set of axioms on firms preferences guaranteeing that the set of unmatched agents is the same under every stable matching. We also propose a weaker condition than responsiveness, called separability with quotas or q-separability, that together with substitutability implies this set of axioms.