INVESTIGADORES
NEME Alejandro Jose
artículos
Título:
A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem
Autor/es:
MASSÓ J. AND NEME A.
Revista:
Social Choice and Welfare
Editorial:
Springer
Referencias:
Año: 2004 vol. 23 p. 229 - 248
ISSN:
0176-1714
Resumen:
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa (1998) result.
