Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

MASSÓ J. AND NEME A.

Games and Economic Behavior

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Año: 2007 vol. 61 p. 331 - 343

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate one of its subgroups to misrepresent their preferences and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a weakly preferred share and all agents in the misrepresenting subgroup obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, and weakly replacement monotonic rules. This class is larger than the set of sequential allotment rules identified in Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997).