INVESTIGADORES
NEME Alejandro Jose
artículos
Título:
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules
Autor/es:
BARBERÁ S., JACKSON M. AND NEME A.
Revista:
Game and Economic Behavior
Editorial:
Elsevier
Referencias:
Año: 1997 vol. 18 p. 1 - 21
ISSN:
0899-8256
Resumen:
We consider the problem of allotting shares of a task or good among agents withsingle peaked preferences over their own shares. Previous characterizations haveexamined rules, such as the uniform rule, which satisfy various symmetry requirements.We consider the case where agents might begin with natural claims tominimal or maximal allotments, or might be treated with different priorities. Weprovide characterizations of the rules which are strategy-proof and efficient, butwhich may treat individuals asymmetrically.
