Aristotle on divisional definition and demonstration in Posterior Analytics 2

FABIAN MIE

BOCHUM

Conferencia; KOLLOQUIUM LEHRSTHUL FÜR PHILOS. DER ANTIKE UND DES MITTELALTERS; 2021

RUHR UNIVERSITÄT BOCHUM

In the Analytics, Aristotle presents a hard criticism against the current method of division; he mainly aims at showing that division is neither a deduction nor a demonstration and that, as it stands, cannot succeed in providing definitions (APo. 2.3-5). Now, Aristotle generally takes definitions to feature in demonstration as the explanatory middle (2.8 93b6), and thus he holds that definitions are the very principles through which all sciences come about (2.17 99a21-22). But he has serious concerns about divisional definition. For instance, he objects that division is a ?weak deduction? (APr. 1.31 46a33) in that it begs the question by always deducing something higher or more general than what must be demonstrated (46a33-34), and that it includes in the premises what should be deduced (APo. 2.4. 91a24-32).