Aristotle on divisional definition and demonstration in Posterior Analytics 2

FABIAN MIE

Tubinga

Conferencia; Seminario superior (Oberseminar) Neuere Forschungen zur Philosophie der Antike (Prof. Klaus Corcilius); 2021

Universidad de Tubinga

In the Analytics, Aristotle presents a hard criticism against the current method of division; he mainly aims at showing that division is neither a deduction nor a demonstration and that, as it stands, cannot succeed in providing definitions (APo. 2.3-5). Now, Aristotle generally takes definitions to feature in demonstration as the explanatory middle (2.8 93b6), and thus he holds that definitions are the very principles through which all sciences come about (2.17 99a21-22). But he has serious concerns about divisional definition. For instance, he objects that division is a ?weak deduction? (APr. 1.31 46a33) in that it begs the question by always deducing something higher or more general than what must be demonstrated (46a33-34), and that it includes in the premises what should be deduced (APo. 2.4. 91a24-32). The closing passage at the end of 2.7 summarizes the rather negative results achieved through the diaporematic examination of division and definition in 2.3-7