The limits of anti-realism and the extension of the psychological vocabulary to non-human animals.

ANDRÉS CRELIER

Konstanz

Seminario; Kolloquium zur Theoretische Philosophie.; 2020

Philosophisches Seminar. Universität Konstanz (Alemania)

The presentation argues against philosophical anti-realism regarding the attribution of intentional attitudes to non-human animals. Whereas philosophy tends to be anti-realist on this issue, the scientific research explains the cognitive abilities of many species attributing such attitudes. I discuss this tension in three steps. (1) I review recent cases of attribution of intentional attitudes in three research fields and outline the anti-realist reaction in philosophy. (2) I try to mitigate some philosophical objections that support anti-realist perspectives. (3) I defend, within certain limits, a ?literalist? (Figdor) extension of the psychological vocabulary outside the human realm. I suggest that the latter can be seen as a step toward a more realist stance on the attribution of thoughts to some animals.