Liberal Naturalism and non-epistemic Values

CRESPO, RICARDO F.

Cracovia

Jornada; European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences International Conference; 2017

ENPOSS

The ?value free ideal?, a requirement for science correctness enjoying a long tradition since the Eighteen century, has been called into question for different reasons. This requirement does not include ?epistemic values? such as explanatory and unifying power, simplicity, consistency and predictive accuracy, which are generally considered as characteristic of ?good science?, and it rejects the so-called ?contextual?, ?non-cognitive? or ?non-epistemic? values ? all of them being personal, moral, or political values. This paper will analyze a possible complementary argument about the dubitable validity of the value free ideal. The strategy will not be to renounce to it but to understand it in a different way in social sciences. The paper will argue that values are an essential part of the subject of those sciences and that, consequently, the ideal would not consist in throwing values away from them, but to put values on the table and rationally discuss them.