The effect of in-group and out-group prescriptive norms in Dictator Game decisions: A test in the context of a presidential election

FREIDIN ESTEBAN; CARLOS MAXIMILIANO SENCI; BRENDA ELIZABETH RYAN; CARBALLO FABRICIO

Wageningen

Conferencia; Behavioural Insights in Research and Policy Making; 2016

Wageningen University

Background: Social norms have been shown to play an ubiquitous role in Dictator Game (DG) decisions. For instance, when participants estimate others? opinions about the most socially appropriate behavior in the game (i.e., the prescriptive norm), they are more likely to choose the equitable distribution (Krupka & Weber, 2009) or a distribution closer to the equity norm (Senci et al., in preparation) relative to a control group.In the present study, we explored normative influences on DG decisions after participants thought about in-group or out-group prescriptive norms in the context of the 2015 Argentine presidential election.Others? group identity is supposed to be a key factor influencing people?s sensitivity to these others? opinions. On one hand, many theoretical developments (e.g., Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1986; gene-culture co-evolution of parochial altruism, Bowles et al., 2003) and empirical results (e.g., Bernhard et al., 2006; Baldasarri & Grossman, 2013) lead to expect in-group normative opinions to have a stronger influence on behavior than out-group norms. This could be so for many reasons such as people seeking to assert their social identity by following in-group norms or learning to expect punishment from transgression of such norms. From this view, we would expect DG decisions to be closer to the equity norm when participants estimate in-groups? than out-groups? normative opinions. On the other hand, reference to the out-group norm in the context of an election might lead to social identity performance, namely behaviors that attempt to change the others? stereotypes and treatment of the in-group (Klein et al., 2007). This notion is close to the idea of competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998), though applied to concerns for the reputation of the group. From this view, we would expect more pro-social decisions after participants estimate out-groups? than in-groups? normative opinion. This prediction should stand in the pre-election context when the reputation of the group can have strong consequences on the group?s success, but not after the election when stakes are much lower.Methods: We recruited 70 university students (56% women) from a wide variety of disciplines (e.g., economics, psychology, biology, education, engineering, among others) in Bahía Blanca, Argentina, and we did a paper-and-pencil DG at the Universidad Nacional del Sur. We ran sessions in a period involving a few weeks before and a few weeks after the 2015 presidential ballotage that defined the election between candidates Mauricio Macri (who was eventually elected) and Daniel Scioli. We defined the in-group and the out-group based on participants? reported sympathy for each presidential candidate. All participants had to estimate previous participants? opinion about the most socially appropriate behavior in the DG before actually playing the game for real money. In sessions both before and after the election, we implemented two independent treatments: 1) in treatment Macri (n=35), participants had to estimate Macri sympathizers? prescriptive norm before154making their decisions in the DG, whereas 2) in treatment Scioli (n=35), participants had to estimate Scioli sympathizers? prescriptive norm before playing the game.Results: Participants? estimation of the prescriptive norm was similar (close to the 50-50 split) regardless of whether they had to estimate the opinion of one or the other candidate sympathizers (Mann-Whitney U test, Z=0.62, P=0.54). Nevertheless, those guessing the opinion of the right-wing-candidate sympathizers (i.e., Macri) made significantly more selfish decisions than those guessing the opinion of the by-then-official-candidate sympathizers (i.e., Scioli) (Mann-Whitney U test, Z=2.32, P=0.02). Furthermore, for each participant, we built a score with the difference between his or her degree of sympathy for one candidate and the other. This score was built so that positive numbers indicated more sympathy towards the candidate whose sympathizers? opinion the participant had to estimate. Then, we divided Macri-Scioli treatments in halves by the median of this candidate-sympathy score to compare DG decisions of those that guessed the opinion of in-groups (Macri sympathizers that guessed Macri sympathizers? opinion, or Scioli sympathizers that guessed Scioli sympathizers? opinion) versus those that guessed the opinion of out-groups (Macri sympathizers that guessed Scioli sympathizers? opinion, or Scioli sympathizers that guessed Macri sympathizers? opinion). This analysis showed that, before the election, participants estimating the out-group norm chose in closer consistency with the equity norm (i.e., less selfishly) than participants estimating the in-group norm (Mann-Whitney U test, Z=2.43, P=0.015). This effect disappeared after the election (Mann-Whitney U test, Z=0.17, P=0.86). In addition, participants estimating the out-group norm chose more altruistically before than after the election (Mann-Whitney U test, Z=2.12, P=0.03).Discussion: Present results showed that people follow group norms in a flexible context-dependent manner. When group competition for votes was at stake, participants behaved more pro-socially when thought about the out-group than the in-group norm (despite both estimated norms were similarly close to the fair share). Once the election was behind, there was no difference in DG decisions after thinking about the out-group or the in-group. In addition, those thinking about the out-group chose more pro-socially before than after the election. These results are in stark contrast with the idea that in-group norms are always more influential than out-group norms. Nonetheless, these data can still be interpreted as consistent with an underlying motivation to impose the interests of the in-group. In particular, results are consistent with Klein and collaborators? (2007) notion of social identity performance. Nonetheless, future studies should confirm whether participants? increased pro-sociality when reminded of the out-group norm was strategically unraveled to influence out-groups? opinion of the in-group.Last but not least, participants primed to think of the right-wing candidate sympathizers? norm chose more selfishly than participants who thought about the other candidate sympathizers? opinions. This result cannot be attributed to differences in the estimated norm between the groups because there was no such difference. It seems plausible that reference to one and/or the other candidate might have activated specific attitudes in relation to altruism and pro-sociality. This interpretation would be consistent with the association found between political (liberal vs. conservative) and social value orientations (cooperative and pro-social vs. pro-self) (Van Lange et al., 2012).