On the reiterability of pragmata. A Schutzian ?alternate? to the sociological concept of ?practice?

CARLOS BELVEDERE

Buenos Aires

Conferencia; Life-World, Politics and Power; 2014

The International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science

Schutz developed a complex, multifaceted concept of pragma which goes well beyond the concept of rational action. According to him, pragmata are articulated into four strata: a) the pragma without the purpose and project; b) the pragma with the purpose but without the project; c) the pragma with the project and purpose; and d) the pragma with the project but without the purpose. As we can see, only one out of four kinds of pragmata are ?rational acting?: the pragma with the project and purpose. So, the pragma is both more and less than rational action: it is more because it covers a wider range than action, and it is less because ?with the exception made of the pragma with the project and purpose- it has fewer requirements ?it does not need to be consciously aware of the end (purpose) and it does not pursue nor does it need to know about the adequate means to achieve it-. Moreover, Schutz considers that the first kind of pragma (without the purpose and the project) does not even need to be intentional. Schutz developed further these ideas, explicitly distinguishing ?conscious pragma? from ?unconscious pragma.? The conscious pragma is not only intentional but also directed to a ?purpose.? On the contrary, the unconscious pragma ?lacks purpose as well as project?. Based on this, Schutz renames the first type of pragma ?formerly called ?mere reaction? or ?mere behavior?- as ?unconscious pragma?. Of course, unconscious pragma is what he then meant by that, except we know now that it lacks the specific feature of conscious pragma: the intended purpose. Afterward, Schutz speaks of habitual behaving as the second type of pragma, i.e., the ?empirical behavior?. Although we don?t have here a new name for this, it is enlightening to know that this kind of pragma refers to habitualities since they play a role in the genesis of the social person, as I will show in my paper. It is even more interesting to note that Schutz calls the third kind of pragama ?action in the full sense?, confirming what he had said before about the pragma with the project and purpose. Schutz also distinguishes actual and potential pragma. Only the pragma accomplished by ?my self now? can be said to be actual and real. On the contrary, the pragma accomplished by ?my self before? is characterized as potential and, consequently, as a ?reality in the mode of probability? derived from an ?earlier core of reality?. Finally, the ?reiterableness of the same pragma? and of ?an analogous pragma? by ?my self later on? is ?contained in the idealization of ?I always can again?.? Schutz not only distinguishes different kinds but also different levels of potentiality. There are actual and potential pragma, and the later can belong to the first or the second level of potentiality.