INVESTIGADORES
CRESPO Ricardo Fernando
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Economics of happiness and positive psychology
Autor/es:
CRESPO, RICARDO F.
Lugar:
Rotterdam
Reunión:
Jornada; XI INEM Conference; 2013
Institución organizadora:
International Network for Ecobnomic Method and Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Resumen:
Economics of
happiness and positive psychology
Today we are
witnessing an increasing acknowledgment of the need to take into account the
ends of individual behaviour in economics. Examples of this wave are the
happiness approach and the capability approach (CA). Economics of happiness
focuses on the content of happiness which is an ultimate end or a set of ends.
It explores new variables and is mind-opening, raising unexpected anomalies
concerning the springs of human actions that may positively influence economic
policy. Its empirical findings are relevant and highly enlightening. It is
mainly based in empirical surveys.
As it
becomes gradually recognized, there is no empirical research uncommitted with
values. The economics of happiness is based on psychological positions that
ultimately recline in their philosophical concepts. It has been pointed out
that the psychological and philosophical conceptions of happiness of this
branch of economics are far from being comprehensive. This would be the dark
side of this good news. Thus, this is a point that
deserves exploration: is the happiness economics
concept of happiness a rich concept? And if not, are there alternative
possibilities? The
facts are that economics became interested in happiness and that, consequently,
there is no reason to think that it will not be open to hearing suggestions
about the content of this concept.
In this
paper, I will begin by the philosophical roots, arguing that the Aristotelian
concept of eudaimonia is a complete
concept of happiness. According to Bruni and Porta (2007) relational happiness
is a comprehensive concept of it, which serves as an explanation for the
"Easterlin Paradox". I will also argue that this relational concept
could be considered as a right and complete interpretation of the Aristotelian
concept of eudaimonia.
Second, I
will confirm that the concept of happiness behind happiness economics is mostly
hedonistic and I will show the shortcomings of this position. Both Julia Annas
(2001, p. 127) and Pierluigi Barrotta (2008, p. 149) critically quote the same
passage of Richard Layards Happiness.
Lessons from a New Science (2005, p. 4): Happiness is feeling good, and
misery is feeling bad. Layard thinks with Bentham that happiness is a hedonic
reality that can be measured; he simultaneously rejects Mills qualitative
dimension of happiness. Additionally, Layard
(2007: 162) asserts that good tastes are those which increase happiness, and
vice versa. Wijngaards (2012, p. 103) summarizes his analysis of Layards
concept of happiness asserting that is to be understood in a hedonic sense,
based upon a pleasure/pain duality. This concept of happiness is rudimentary.
To suffer difficulties is part of a true happiness: as Annas asserts, a life
of having all your desires fulfilled without the problems created by human
neediness leaves humans with nothing to live for, nothing to propel them onwards (2011, p. 137). True happiness
goes beyond life satisfaction. Nick Begley (2010) reviews the literature about
surveys on subjective well-being and physiological (objective) studies of
happiness. He concludes that there is a general agreement in that these two
psychological approaches to happiness are mainly hedonic and that truly eudaimonic dimensions would complete the
assessment of happiness. Some more sophisticated psychological constructs
include eudaimonic elements such as
positive relations with others, personal growth, and purpose or meaning in
life. However, Begley notes, they do not make reference to a key element of
Aristotles eudaimonia, i.e., virtue.
A quick review of the literature and questions of the surveys for measuring
subjective well-being shows that the words associated with happiness are
tastes, feelings, desires, satisfaction, pleasure and displeasure.
Concerning objective happiness, as Frey and Stutzer (2002: 5) assert, this
approach comes close to the idea of a hedometer.
Third in the paper, I will analyze if an alternative psychological
current, the "Positive Psychology", is a better psychological basis
for happiness economics. Annas has recently connected the "Positive
Psychology" currently led by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi with happiness
through virtue (Annas 2011: Chapter 5). The paper tries to assess whether this
is effectively a good framework for the relational conception of happiness. Is
positive psychology a more promising perspective? This is a recent movement of
psychology that does not concentrate on understanding pathologies but on the
good functioning of individuals, the positive aspects of human life. Csikszentmihalyi
has used the term flow to designate an optimal enjoyable experience, which
constitutes an end in itself (it is autotelic). Flow experiences appear when
the individual performs activities in which he is an expert; he enjoys both
doing them and being given immediate feedback. We should learn to derive
moment-by-moment enjoyment from everything we do (1990, p. 8). This supposes
that the individual has a harmonic set of clearly defined goals and
commitments, and that they are in control of their lives (1990, p. 10).
According to Csikszentmihalyi, we achieve happiness indirectly when we perform
these kinds of activities, doing our best. Annas (2011, pp. 70ff.) holds that
these characteristics of the flow experience as developed by Csikszentmihalyi apply
in the case of virtue: the virtuous person experiences enjoyment and
satisfaction in her activity and not just in the result (2011, p. 82).
Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde and Whalen (1993, p. 13) expressly assert:
Aristotle extolled the enjoyment derived from the achievement of excellence in
activity and called it virtue
The form in which this idea is expressed in
this volume is that of the flow model of
optimal experience. Additionally, one of the questions used in the Survey
about flow in the same work (1993, pp. 275-6) describes it almost as Aristotle
would describe virtue: Do you ever do something where your skills have become
so second nature that sometimes everything seems to come you naturally or
effortlessly, and where you feel confident that you will be ready to meet any
new challenges? Diane Coyle (2011, p. 50) mentions this connection between Csikszentmihalyis
positive psychology and Aristotles support of a virtuous life.
The work of
Csikszentmihalyi has been continued by Martin Seligman, who emphasizes the role
of virtues for attaining happiness. Peterson and Seligman (2004) defined
specific strengths fostering some virtues that constitute a good character.
According to them, this is the key to be happy. Although the aim of their book
is not explicitly ethical, but mainly descriptive and classificatory, it
encourages the development of these strengths and virtues.
Specifically,
it considers six classes of virtues (core virtues), promoted by twenty-four
measurable character strengths:
1. Wisdom and Knowledge, with the strengths of creativity,
curiosity, love of learning, and wisdom.
2. Courage, eased by the strengths of bravery,
persistence, integrity,
and vitality.
3. Humanity, a virtue that is especially regarded by others and strengthened
further by love, kindness,
and social intelligence.
4. Justice, which looks at the social
community, facilitated by active citizenship/social responsibility/loyalty/teamwork,
fairness and leadership.
5. Temperance, with the strengths of forgiveness
and mercy, humility
and modesty and prudence,
and self-regulation and self-control.
6. Transcendence, strengthened by appreciation of beauty
and of excellence, gratitude,
hope,
humour and playfulness, and spirituality.
In
this part, the paper will specially focus on the last book of Seligman (2011).
This
set of virtues corresponds approximately to the Aristotelian classical virtues
leading to eudaimonia, as developed
in his Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. Additionally, it
includes relational goods. Given that as firstly argued, Aristotles concept of
eudaimonia, which is relational,
constitutes a highly comprehensive concept of happiness and that positive
psychology fits with it, the conclusion is that positive psychology could be a
very complete psychological theory to apply in the economics of happiness. This
could be a very fruitful program to develop.
References:
Annas, Julia (2011), Intelligent
Virtue, Oxford University Press.
Barrotta, Pierluigi, 2008. Why Economists Should Be Unhappy with the
Economics of Happiness, Economics and
Philosophy, 24, pp. 145-165.
Begley, Nick, 2010. Psychological Adoption and Adaption of Eudaimonia,
on line in http://positivepsychology.org.uk/pp-theory/eudaimonia/140-the-psychological-adoption-and-adaptation-of-eudaimoni.html,
retrieved March 1, 2012.
Bruni, Luigino and Pier Luigi Porta (2007), Introduction, in Bruni,
Luigino and Pier Luigi Porta (eds.), Handbook
on the Economics of Happiness, Elgar.
Coyle, Diane, 2011. The Economics
of Enough, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly,
1990. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal
Experience, Harper and Row, New York.
Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, Kevin Rathunde and Samuel Whalen, 1993. Talented Teenagers. The Roots of Success and
Failure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Layard, Richard, 2005. Happiness.
Lessons from a New Science, Penguin, New York.
Layard, Richard, 2007. Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the
Profession, in Bruno J. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Economics and Psychology. A Promosing New Cross-Disciplinary Field,
The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 155-168.
Peterson, Christopher and Martin E. P. Seligman, 2004. Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook
and Classification, American Psychological Association and Oxford
University Press, NY.
Seligman, Martin, 2011. Flourish,
Free Press, New York.
Wijngaards, Aloys, 2102. Wordly Theology. On Connecting Public Theology and Economics.
Doctoral Thesis defended at the Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, on line in http://hdl.handle.net/2066/93624.