INVESTIGADORES
CRESPO Ricardo Fernando
congresos y reuniones científicas
Título:
Economics of happiness and positive psychology
Autor/es:
CRESPO, RICARDO F.
Lugar:
Rotterdam
Reunión:
Jornada; XI INEM Conference; 2013
Institución organizadora:
International Network for Ecobnomic Method and Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Resumen:
Economics of happiness and positive psychology     Today we are witnessing an increasing acknowledgment of the need to take into account the “ends” of individual behaviour in economics. Examples of this wave are the happiness approach and the capability approach (CA). Economics of happiness focuses on the content of happiness which is an ultimate end or a set of ends. It explores new variables and is mind-opening, raising unexpected “anomalies” concerning the springs of human actions that may positively influence economic policy. Its empirical findings are relevant and highly enlightening. It is mainly based in empirical surveys.   As it becomes gradually recognized, there is no empirical research uncommitted with values. The economics of happiness is based on psychological positions that ultimately recline in their philosophical concepts. It has been pointed out that the psychological and philosophical conceptions of happiness of this branch of economics are far from being comprehensive. This would be the dark side of this good news. Thus, this is a point that deserves exploration: is the happiness economics’ concept of happiness a rich concept? And if not, are there alternative possibilities? The facts are that economics became interested in happiness and that, consequently, there is no reason to think that it will not be open to hearing suggestions about the content of this concept.   In this paper, I will begin by the philosophical roots, arguing that the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia is a complete concept of happiness. According to Bruni and Porta (2007) relational happiness is a comprehensive concept of it, which serves as an explanation for the "Easterlin Paradox". I will also argue that this relational concept could be considered as a right and complete interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia.   Second, I will confirm that the concept of happiness behind happiness economics is mostly hedonistic and I will show the shortcomings of this position. Both Julia Annas (2001, p. 127) and Pierluigi Barrotta (2008, p. 149) critically quote the same passage of Richard Layard’s Happiness. Lessons from a New Science (2005, p. 4): “Happiness is feeling good, and misery is feeling bad.” Layard thinks with Bentham that happiness is a hedonic reality that can be measured; he simultaneously rejects Mill’s qualitative dimension of happiness. Additionally, Layard (2007: 162) asserts that “good tastes are those which increase happiness, and vice versa.” Wijngaards (2012, p. 103) summarizes his analysis of Layard’s concept of happiness asserting that “is to be understood in a hedonic sense, based upon a pleasure/pain duality.” This concept of happiness is rudimentary. To suffer difficulties is part of a true happiness: as Annas asserts, “a life of having all your desires fulfilled without the problems created by human neediness leaves humans with nothing to live for, nothing to propel them onwards” (2011, p. 137). True happiness goes beyond life satisfaction. Nick Begley (2010) reviews the literature about surveys on subjective well-being and physiological (objective) studies of happiness. He concludes that there is a general agreement in that these two psychological approaches to happiness are mainly hedonic and that truly eudaimonic dimensions would complete the assessment of happiness. Some more sophisticated psychological constructs include eudaimonic elements such as positive relations with others, personal growth, and purpose or meaning in life. However, Begley notes, they do not make reference to a key element of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, i.e., virtue. A quick review of the literature and questions of the surveys for measuring subjective well-being shows that the words associated with happiness are “tastes”, “feelings”, “desires”, “satisfaction”, “pleasure and displeasure.” Concerning objective happiness, as Frey and Stutzer (2002: 5) assert, “this approach comes close to the idea of a hedometer.”   Third in the paper, I will analyze if an alternative psychological current, the "Positive Psychology", is a better psychological basis for happiness economics. Annas has recently connected the "Positive Psychology" currently led by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi with happiness through virtue (Annas 2011: Chapter 5). The paper tries to assess whether this is effectively a good framework for the relational conception of happiness. Is positive psychology a more promising perspective? This is a recent movement of psychology that does not concentrate on understanding pathologies but on the good functioning of individuals, the positive aspects of human life. Csikszentmihalyi has used the term “flow” to designate an optimal enjoyable experience, which constitutes an end in itself (it is “autotelic”). Flow experiences appear when the individual performs activities in which he is an expert; he enjoys both doing them and being given immediate feedback. We should learn to derive moment-by-moment enjoyment from everything we do (1990, p. 8). This supposes that the individual has a harmonic set of clearly defined goals and commitments, and that they are in control of their lives (1990, p. 10). According to Csikszentmihalyi, we achieve happiness indirectly when we perform these kinds of activities, doing our best. Annas (2011, pp. 70ff.) holds that these characteristics of the flow experience as developed by Csikszentmihalyi apply in the case of virtue: “the virtuous person experiences enjoyment and satisfaction in her activity and not just in the result” (2011, p. 82). Csikszentmihalyi, Rathunde and Whalen (1993, p. 13) expressly assert: “Aristotle extolled the enjoyment derived from the achievement of excellence in activity and called it “virtue”… The form in which this idea is expressed in this volume is that of the flow model of optimal experience.” Additionally, one of the questions used in the Survey about flow in the same work (1993, pp. 275-6) describes it almost as Aristotle would describe virtue: “Do you ever do something where your skills have become so “second nature” that sometimes everything seems to come you “naturally” or “effortlessly,” and where you feel confident that you will be ready to meet any new challenges?” Diane Coyle (2011, p. 50) mentions this connection between Csikszentmihalyi’s positive psychology and Aristotle’s support of a virtuous life.   The work of Csikszentmihalyi has been continued by Martin Seligman, who emphasizes the role of virtues for attaining happiness. Peterson and Seligman (2004) defined specific strengths fostering some virtues that constitute a good character. According to them, this is the key to be happy. Although the aim of their book is not explicitly ethical, but mainly descriptive and classificatory, it encourages the development of these strengths and virtues.   Specifically, it considers six classes of virtues (“core virtues”), promoted by twenty-four measurable character strengths: 1. Wisdom and Knowledge, with the strengths of creativity, curiosity, love of learning, and wisdom. 2. Courage, eased by the strengths of bravery, persistence, integrity, and vitality. 3. Humanity, a virtue that is especially regarded by others and strengthened further by love, kindness, and social intelligence. 4. Justice, which looks at the social community, facilitated by active citizenship/social responsibility/loyalty/teamwork, fairness and leadership. 5. Temperance, with the strengths of forgiveness and mercy, humility and modesty and prudence, and self-regulation and self-control. 6. Transcendence, strengthened by appreciation of beauty and of excellence, gratitude, hope, humour and playfulness, and spirituality.   In this part, the paper will specially focus on the last book of Seligman (2011).   This set of virtues corresponds approximately to the Aristotelian classical virtues leading to eudaimonia, as developed in his Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. Additionally, it includes relational goods. Given that as firstly argued, Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia, which is relational, constitutes a highly comprehensive concept of happiness and that positive psychology fits with it, the conclusion is that positive psychology could be a very complete psychological theory to apply in the economics of happiness. This could be a very fruitful program to develop.     References:   Annas, Julia (2011), Intelligent Virtue, Oxford University Press. Barrotta, Pierluigi, 2008. “Why Economists Should Be Unhappy with the Economics of Happiness”, Economics and Philosophy, 24, pp. 145-165. Begley, Nick, 2010. “Psychological Adoption and Adaption of Eudaimonia”, on line in http://positivepsychology.org.uk/pp-theory/eudaimonia/140-the-psychological-adoption-and-adaptation-of-eudaimoni.html, retrieved March 1, 2012.  Bruni, Luigino and Pier Luigi Porta (2007), “Introduction”, in Bruni, Luigino and Pier Luigi Porta (eds.), Handbook on the Economics of Happiness, Elgar. Coyle, Diane, 2011. The Economics of Enough, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1990. Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, Harper and Row, New York. Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, Kevin Rathunde and Samuel Whalen, 1993. Talented Teenagers. The Roots of Success and Failure, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Layard, Richard, 2005. Happiness. Lessons from a New Science, Penguin, New York. Layard, Richard, 2007. “Happiness and Public Policy: A Challenge to the Profession”, in Bruno J. Frey and Alois Stutzer, Economics and Psychology. A Promosing New Cross-Disciplinary Field, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 155-168. Peterson, Christopher and Martin E. P. Seligman, 2004. Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification, American Psychological Association and Oxford University Press, NY. Seligman, Martin, 2011. Flourish, Free Press, New York. Wijngaards, Aloys, 2102. Wordly Theology. On Connecting Public Theology and Economics. Doctoral Thesis defended at the Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, on line in http://hdl.handle.net/2066/93624.