The Tuning-in Relationship: from a Social Theory of Music towards a Philosophical Understanding of Communication

CARLOS BELVEDERE

Universidad de Konstanz

Conferencia; International Conference 'Phenomenology, Social Sciences, and the Arts'; 2009

Universidad de Konstanz (Alemania)

EL LIBRO ESTÁ EN PRENSA. Schutz states that all forms of communication presuppose the existence of some kind of social interaction which does not enter the communicative process and is not capable of being grasped by it; therefore, this sort of interaction precedes all types of communication. Schutz calls it ?the mutual tuning-in relationship? and describes it as a relationship that cannot be related to a conceptual scheme which is established by the reciprocal sharing of the Other?s flux of experiences in inner time by living through a vivid present together and by experiencing this togetherness as a ?We?. It is within this experience that the Other?s conduct becomes meaningful to the partner tuned-in to him; i.e., that the Other?s body and its movements can be interpreted as a field of expression of events within his inner life. Although his theory of the tuning-in relationship is outstanding, Schutz himself points out that its elaboration ?must be reserved for another occasion.? Maybe that?s one reason why it has received several critics. For instance, that of Richard Zaner according to which Schutz?s position on intersubjetivity is not only unclear but also problematic because even though he considers that it is not a ?problem of constitution? but ?a datum of the life-world? ?that is, not a problem of the transcendental sphere (in a Husserlian sense) but a given of the mundane sphere of our life-world-, he depends heavily on Husserl?s notion of ?appresentation? to explain how the Other is given. That?s why Zaner agrees with Eugen Fink?s remark that Schutz?s use of Husserl?s notion of ?appresentation? is metaphoric and unsuccessful. Zaner also thinks that Schutz in his response to Fink fails once again by taking ?a bit too literally? Scheler?s perceptual theory of the alter ego. In response to Zaner, I will try to radicalize Schutz?s perceptual theory of the alter ego. As a first step in this direction, I will turn to Thomas Luckmann?s retrieve of the ?phenomenology of the mind? as a way of showing how, in a sense not opposite to Schutz, it is possible to explore the elementary strata of intersubjectivity taking into account -in a manner not metaphorical and unsuccessful but neither merely erudite- the husserlian notion of appresentation. In fact, Luckmann conceives apresentation as a form of conscious activity which presupposes more elementary intentional processes as the passive syntheses (in Husserl?s sense). Secondly I will go back to Schutz?s conception of the ?tuning-in relationship? in order to explore how does it gets started; i.e., what is the very origin of the first and most fundamental social relationship. I will then describe the tuning-in of consciousness as a non-conceptual and perceptive synthesis.