In Defense of Ontological Reduction

CRISTIAN LÓPEZ

Buenos Aires

Congreso; CLMPST 2023; 2023

CLMPST

It is being increasingly acknowledged that reductionism is not a mammoth doctrine, but parceled and multifaceted. If this is the case, then the failures of reductionism in some parcels do not imply failures in others. Nor does a failure in one facet entail the failure of the whole doctrine. In this presentation, I am concerned with the relation between inter-theory reduction and ontological reduction. It has been argued that the failures of inter-theory reduction imply (or, at least, suggest) that ontological reductionism also fails. This would, in turn, imply some form of ontological emergence or pluralism for a lack of a better choice. But for this argument to go through, it must assume that scientific theories somehow fix the ontology. The argument would hence look as follows: 1.Scientific theories fix the ontology. 2.Scientific theories fix reductive, emergent or pluralist ontologies3.Ontological reduction entails inter-theory reduction.4.Inter-theory reduction fails. 5.Therefore, ontological reduction also fails.C. Emergentism or pluralism are the only options left I believe that (1) and (2) are untenable. Without them, the argument does not go through. In consonance, I will defend two theses in this presentation. First, the failures of inter-theory reduction are compatible with metaphysical reduction. This follows from showing that scientific theories do not fix the ontology, which means that failures of ontological reduction should be argued for independently from failures of inter-theory reduction. Second, I believe that metaphysical reduction is not only an attractive doctrine within science, but also inevitable. In virtue of this, it is hard to reject.