Aristotle’s Second Thoughts on Nous in Metaphysics Λ9: Thinking of Thinking

FABIAN MIE

Goiania

Workshop; Workshop on Aristotle?s Metaphysics Lambda (Reading Seminar); 2023

Universidad Nacional del Litoral-Universidade Federal de Goiás

I intend to make plausible that the conception of divine intellect in Λ9 is coherent with that of Λ7 and also generally in line with the theory of the first principle of motion whose substance is actuality in Λ6. More precisely, I contend that Λ9 elaborates mainly on the actuality or activity feature granted to the prime mover in Λ6 (1071b20) and discusses for the divine intellect the more general (and still unwarranted) thesis of Λ7 that the intellect thinks itself (1072b19-20). The first of these tasks is fulfilled in Λ9 by showing the essentially active nature of the divine intellect or thinking; the second by means of the much debated thesis that the divine thinking is essentially identical to what is thought. A general claim that we can reconstruct in Λ7 is that the first unmoved mover moves as being loved in that its nature is to be a pure intellect; it is implied that the unmoved mover is a substance that is separate from any sensible body and magnitude, although it is a certain cause and active with regard to the physical heaven. As an essentially active intellect, and unlike the human intellect, it is not a faculty, i.e. a capacity that is activated by becoming in touch with the intelligible. Aristotle suggests, therefore, that the divine intellect stands out for its being always active, i.e. for its being always thinking this corresponds to its being a pure actuality (1072b27). Another claim is about the sameness condition between intellect and intelligible (1072b21), which seems to stem from the general theory of the intellect in DA III 4-6 (which, in this respect, shows some relevant parallel to perception). At a general level, the sameness condition results from the idea that the actualized intellect and the intelligible coincide and so are, in a way, one and the same, although they are not the same in being. A possible contrast to this in Λ9 is that, if the divine thinking is purely active, then the sameness valid for it and its object cannot be as in the human intellect, which is a faculty acted upon by something with which it comes in touch. Thus, in contrast to the general theory of DA, which indicates that the human intellect turns out to be like the intelligible by grasping it, the purely active divine intellect must be the same as the intelligible which, from what we know from Λ7 (1072a31-32), it is the substance that is primary, simple and in actuality in a much stronger way. I will suggest that the strong sameness between the divine intellect and its object can be explained if we take into account that, as a result of being always active, the intellect has always been the same as the intelligible, and, on its part, the intelligible has always been actualized. This can be explained in terms of sameness in being.