MINIMALISTIC RATIONALITY: WHAT WITTGENSTEIN AND PYRRHONIAN SKEPTICISM COULD TEACH US ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

REINOSO, GUADALUPE

Buenos Aires

Exposición; Ciclo de Charlas SADF; 2019

Sadaf

In On Certainty, the last notes written by Wittgenstein, he takes Moore?s answer against the skeptical radical challenge to analyze the postulation of ?truisms? -or basic certainties- as a legitimate answer. Wittgenstein is interested in the status of these ?truisms? because he believes they reveal an important aspect of our elementary beliefs. We do not have evidence to support or justify these truisms; however, we do not question them as the skeptic does. In recent years, it has been proposed to read this strategy not from the perspective of modern (or radical) skepticism, but from the ancient sources of skepticism, especially by comparing Wittgenstein?s notes with the Outlines of Scepticism by Sextus Empiricus (Fogelin 1981, 1987, 1994; Sluga 2004; Smith 1993; Pritchard 2016). I consider that a comparative work between these truisms and the acceptance of a non-intellectual way of téchnē (translated as ?craft?, ?art? or ?skill?) in Sextus can shed light on the anti-theoretical strategy that Wittgenstein displays in On Certainty about truisms as practical knowledge. On the other hand, and from certain interpretations, this critical and non-intellectual orientation shared by them can be understood as a destructive approach to philosophy, to our knowledge, to our rationality. I believe that Wittgenstein and Sextus, through each of their critical orientations against metaphysical dogmatism, do not develop a destructive approach but a new way of understanding the exercise of philosophy, our possibilities of knowing and our rationality. However, this new way of understanding them does not imply the possibility of offering substantive epistemic guarantees or alternative epistemological theories. In both cases, the focus is not on expanding the notion of rationality in order to add new elements (truisms or skills) but, on the contrary, reducing the dogmatic metaphysical and foundationalist pretensions. Only after critical work is done, this minimalistic perspective of rationality appears and these basic elements (truisms, skills, convictions, affections, etc.) are understood as a constitutive part of our rationality without the demand for a foundationalist epistemic justification. For all these reasons, this paper will defend that the critical philosophical orientation shared by Wittgenstein and Sextus is supposed to emphasize the practical way of understanding our knowledge and the minimalistic way of assuming our rationality.This paper explores these topics as follows: First, by making the distinction between practical and propositional (or theoretical) knowledge in On Certainty (Coliva 2010; Moyal-Sharrock 2004; Stroll 1994) to evaluate the status of Moore?s truisms. Second, the distinction between criterion of truth and practical criterion in Sextus Empiricus allows for the analysis of the notion of téchnē as practical knowledge (Blank 1998). Third, the distinction between knowing-how/knowing-that from an anti-intellectualist approach allows to show that, although Wittgenstein and Sextus propose a different strategy, both share a non-theoretical vision of knowledge. Fourth, both share an anti-intellectualist approach that implies a particular orientation about philosophy, knowledge and our rationality. The way of understanding the limitation of philosophy to offer explanations and epistemic guarantees and the key role of practical knowledge allows us to consider our rationality in minimalistic terms. Consequently, and in more general terms, I argue that both Wittgenstein and Sextus share, and teach us, a way of understanding rationality in a minimalistic but not reductive sense, different from the way in which dogmatism, the modern skeptic and Moore do it.