Some Remarks on the Problem of Closeness

LAURA MANRIQUE

Oxford

Congreso; Double Effect Conference; 2011

Anscombe Bioethic Centre

A classical challenge for the doctrine of double effect is the problem of closeness, i.e the identification of criteria for distinguishing between intended and foreseen state of affairs. In this paper I show that this problem needs dissolution rather than solution. Specially, I defend two connected ideas: on the one hand, philosophers actually do not agree on what it means to solve the problem of closeness and, on the other hand, it is necessary to separate different kinds of problems, e.g. conceptual, semantic and empirical ones in order to make a genuine progress in the analysis of closeness. Finally, I claim both that intention is a ‘mental state’ conceptually connected with human actions and that the explanation of actions depends on the identification of a specific intention which guides the behaviour of a particular agent. ACLARACIÓN: El presente trabajo fue presentado en un call for papers realizado por el centro de bioetica Anscombe (Oxford). Mi trabajo fue seleccionado como ganador y seria expuesto en ese congreso. Sin embargo, no pude asistir por falta de subsidio para realizar esta actividad.