"Animales no racionales"

DANIEL KALPOKAS

Naturaleza, significado, experiencia: hacia una reconstrucción de la filosofía

Universitas

Lugar: Córdoba; Año: 2005; p. 121 - 128

ABSTRACT   This paper states the following thesis: non human animals can think. In order to demonstrate that statement, it is discussed Davidson's thesis, which claims that non-rational animals cannot think because they do not have propositional attitudes. A creature can not have that sort of attitudes without using a language. Therefore, for Davidson, language is essential to thought. Contrary to Davisonian opinion, first, it is argued that, in order to have a belief, is not necessary to have the concept of belief. Secondly, a critical examination of the Davidsonian theory of triangulation shows that the relations among the three poles of the triangle cannot be merely causal, but signical. There is not triangulation without using signs. It is suggested that the combination of the Davidsonian triangulation with the peircean theory of signs can elucidate the nature of thought. Then, if non-human animals can triangulate (as Davidson concedes), non-human animals must use signs. But if they use signs, they have beliefs. A creature can think if and only if it can interpret signs (whatever the signs are).