Wittgenstein and Neopyrrhonism. Metaphilosophy, Arguments and Persuasion

REINOSO, GUADALUPE

Topoi

Springer

Año: 2021

0167-7411

Wittgensteins latest work, On Certainty, has not only been read as the dissolution of Cartesian skepticism but as a proposal of new skepticism. This new skepticism has been understood by R. Fogelin (1976, 1981, 1994) as close to Sextus Empiricuss Pyrrhonism. Therefore, he called it Neopyrrhonism. To Fogelin, both authors share the epistemological strategy that assumes that basic beliefs of common sense do not require any type of justification but cannot be doubted either. My proposal is to review this epistemological interpretation of the notion of Neopyrrhonism in light of the metaphilosophical aspects developed by both authors. These aspects highlight the non-theoretical and therapeutic way of understanding philosophy, as well as the persuasive-argumentative abilities they share. Therefore, I suggest conceiving of Neopyrrhonism as metaphilosophy rather than as one kind of philosophy focused on the problem of knowledge or justification. [EL ARTÍCULO SE ENCUENTRA EN EVALUACIÓN]