The resolution of the antinomy of the teleological judgment. Can we assert that the intelligent world-cause has an intuitive understanding?

CLAUDIA JÁUREGUI

International Philosophical Quarterly

Fordham University

Lugar: New York; Año: 2021 vol. 61 p. 161 - 174

0019-0365

In §§ 62-82 of Kant´s Critique of the Power of Judgment, we find several references to the supersensible in the context of the solution of the antinomy of the power of teleological judgment. It is not, however, plainly clear how these references relate to each other, and how they contribute to the proposed solution. Specially puzzling is the way in which the idea of an intelligent author of the world is related to the idea of an intuitive understanding. Some interpreters have considered that the intelligent author of the world should possess an understanding capable of intuiting. However, Kant never expressly establishes this relationship.In this paper, I intend to show that the idea of an intelligent author of the world cannot be enlarged with the idea of an intuitive understanding, and that both references to the supersensible constitute pieces of argumentation that perform different functions.