On the Adoption Problem and Meta-Logical Monism

JONATHAN ERENFRYD; JOAQUÍN TORANZO CALDERON; MAURO SANTELLI

Análisis Filosófico

Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico

Año: 2021

0326-1301

The Adoption Problem (AP) (Kripke, n/d, Padró, 2015) poses a challenge totheories of reasoning which explain an agent?s ability to draw inferences by theacquisition of propositional logical principles. It is concluded that certain basic logicalprinciples cannot be adopted. Drawing on the AP, Suki Finn (2019a) presents anargument against Logical Pluralism. According to her proposal, Modus Ponens (MP)and Universal Instantiation (UI) both govern a general structure shared by every logicalrule. As such, analogues of these two rules must be present in every Meta-Logic for anylogical system L, effectively imposing a restriction to Logical Pluralism at the meta-level through their presence constituting a ?Meta-Logical monism?.In this paper we offer a series of arguments against Finn?s reading of the AP andits commitments regarding the relationship between Logic and inferential practice.Without rejecting the Adoption Problem, we argue that there is a tension in the dual rolethat the ?unadoptable rules? must play in Finn?s ?Meta-Logical monism? that renders itineffective to restrict logical theories and systems. They cannot be both analogues ofMP and UI (as specified in a logic) and inferentially productive (unlike their objectcounterparts). We conclude with a series of suggestions regarding where a moresatisfying and robust interpretation of the AP could lie.