Peirce y lo incognoscible. Respuesta a Damiani

DANIEL KALPOKAS

Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe

Asociación Revista de Filosofía de Santa Fe

Año: 2011 p. 1 - 11

1666-485X

This article replies to Damiani's objections to a previous paper of mine about the incognizable in Peirce: "The Incognizable and the Bounds of Sense". I point out that our disagreements are mainly about two points: (1) whether it has any sense to assert that we cannot know if there are incognizables, and (2) whether Peirce can defend his thesis ("The absolutely incognizable is absolutely inconceivable") without presupposing the idealism as a thesis about the nature of reality. I argue in favor of a positive answer for the first point, and a negative one for the second, and thus I try to justify an agnostic attitude with respect to the incognizable: we cannot know whether there are incognizables.