Rigidity and Contingency

EDUARDO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ

Análisis, Revista de Investigación Filosófica

Universidad de Zaragoza

Lugar: Zaragoza; Año: 2019 vol. 6 p. 15 - 37

2386-8066

At least since Kripke (1980) it has been generally accepted that true identity statementsinvolving proper names are necessarily true. This view is allegedly supported by our mostordinary, pretheoretic intuitions according to which ordinary proper names are rigiddesignators. This paper challenges the established status of this view. Section 1 developsthe context of the debate by presenting the intuitions of rigidity and of contingencyof identity found among competent speakers. Section 2 shows how the latter constitutea serious problem for the received view, one that cannot be easily ignored. Section3 considers three available proposals intended to solve the problem and shows whythey fail. Section 4 briefly describes a way to make compatible the intuitions of rigidityand of contingency, a consequence of which is the acceptance of the possibility ofcontingently true identity statements. If this is correct, then a longstanding thesis ofcontemporary orthodoxy owed to Kripke (1980), namely, that the rigidity of namesentails the necessity of true claims involving them, turns out to be doubtful. Section 5considers some philosophical consequences of accepting such a view.