INVESTIGADORES
SEMESHENKO Viktoriya
artículos
Título:
Informational-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals
Autor/es:
SEMESHENKO VIKTORIYA; GARAPIN ALEXIS; RUFFIEUX BERNARD; GORDON MIRTA B
Revista:
THEORY AND DECISION
Editorial:
Springer
Referencias:
Año: 2009 vol. 69 p. 119 - 142
ISSN:
0040-5833
Resumen:
We study experimentally a coordination game with N heterogeneous individuals under different information treatments. We explore the effects of information on the emergence of Pareto-efficient outcomes, by means of a gradual decrease of the information content provided to the players in successive experiments. We observe that successful coordination is possible with private information alone, although not on a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Reinforcement-based learning models reproduce the qualitative trends of the experimental results.
