Six core assumptions for a new conceptual framework for economics

GUSTAVO MARQUÉS

Real-World Economics Review

World Economics Association

Lugar: Bristol; Año: 2015 p. 17 - 26

1755-9472

This paper offers an outline for the construction of a theory of economic behavior under uncertainty which incorporates the practice of agents in their twofold role as decision-makers and lobbyists. Two scenarios (complexity and uncertainty) and the behavior under uncertainty of three different types of economic agencies (agents, theorists and philosophers) are analyzed. But although ontological issues are at the bottom of our analysis, how the world really is matters less to agents? decisions than do the beliefs these agents hold about reality. The perceived facts (the prevailing ontology) are more relevant for understanding the results of their decisions than their decisions themselves. Therefore, in order to model agents? behavior it is important to clarify their beliefs about both the world they inhabit and the knowledge they have about it. Their behavior will be different if they believe the world is complex or uncertain. If they believe the former and behave rationally, they will seek to use the best available information and to enlarge it as much as possible, in order to improve their decisions. If they believe that the world is uncertain, however, what would be rational is to intervene a posteriori on the original decisions for the purpose of validating them. Agents who believe in the uncertain nature of the world are moved to become lobbyists and this contributes to generate open-ended and intervenible economic processes.