CONICET | Buscador de Institutos y Recursos Humanos

The relation between phenomenology and social sciences has gone through various stages. In phenomenological philosophy, its outstanding landmarks can be found in: a) the counterpoint that Husserl posited for the different sciences and his mounting interest in social sciences, b) the reinforcement of this line of thought by his followers -Schutz and Merleau-Ponty, for example-, and c) the radicalization of "non-intentional phenomenology" produced by Levinas and Henry. In the ambit of social sciences, Schutz has been acknowledged to have been first in trying to establish the connection between both disciplines by broaching the phenomenology of the natural attitude understood as phenomenological psychology, thus freeing social sciences from the rule of philosophy because. From this perspective, they do not stem from it but from the life-world, a space that can be accessed by the methodology of social research, however restrictedly because it ends subdued to methodological deliberations. As a result, the relation between phenomenology and ontology remains unaccounted for. In this work we therefore outline a four-step program aimed at awaking social phenomenology from its dogmatic slumber. The subject we have chosen has already become a classic. Countless books, papers, and courses of study have come under this title (and its many variants and versions) throughout the 20th Century. Among the most memorable ones, we could mention 'Les sciences de l´homme et la phénoménologie' by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, as well as 'Phenomenology and the social sciences' by Alfred Schutz. Husserl himself established the first links of a chain that connects both fields of knowledge, instating what would later take root as a significant tradition both to phenomenology and social sciences. Hence, let us begin by tracing the sequential versions of this issue, because I agree with Merleau- Ponty that philosophy should not be separated from the history of philosophy.

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