Symmetrical Core and Shapley Value of an Information Tranferal Game

GALDEANO, PATRICIA LUCIA; QUINTAS, LUIS GUILLERMO

Trends in Mathematical Economics

Springer

Lugar: New York; Año: 2015;

In this paper we study some properties and we characterize the Symmetrical Core of an information transferal game. We analyze the relation of the Symmetrical Core and the Shapley Value. This type of games was introduced by Galdeano, Oviedo and Quintas (2010) and also studied by Hou and Driessen (2012). It consists of an information market game involving n identical firms and an innovator having relevant information for the firms (e.g. a new technology).We analyze how the symmetrical part of the Core varies according with the initial information level and the value of information. We also present conditions in order that the Shapley Value belongs to the Symmetrical Core.We also compare the cooperative outcomes with the noncooperative equilibrium of the game studied by Quintas (1995)