Two popultions, two strategies and a conflict: An evolutionary approach

ELVIO ACCINELLI GAMBA; FELIPE MARTINS; QUINTAS, LUIS GUILLERMO

Revista de Análisis de Economía, Comercio y Negocios Internacionales

UASLP

Lugar: San Luis Potosi; Año: 2019 vol. 13 p. 75 - 80

2007-2104

In this paper we study the mathematical foundations of different evolutionary models that analyze the evolution of a society composed of two populations with antagonistic interests. Populations are involved in a conflict whose solution depends on the action chosen by eachindividual. None of them are able to impose a solution on the other population. Two individuals,one from each population, are randomly chosen to play a game. In a strategic way,each individual of each population, must choose one of two feasible strategies. The solutio nobtained for each population will be the result of the aggregated action of the individuals.