Reconstruction of Continuities John Dewey and the Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Scientific Inquiries

LIVIO MATTAROLLO

Cambridge

Congreso; 2nd Young Scholars Pragmatists Conference; 2021

University of Cambridge

Within the current debate on thevalue-free science ideal, one of the most controversial issues refers to the place and role of non-epistemic values inscientific inquiries (Longino 1990, Lacey1999, Douglas 2009, Kourany 2010, Kitcher 2011). This includes, at least, twomain questions: (i) at what stage of scientific inquiriesnon-epistemic values do play a role, and (ii) underwhat conditions this role is or is not legitimate. My aim is to analyzethese topics from John Dewey´sperspective so as to identify his contributions to the debate. As startingpoints, I take Dewey?s idea ofinquiry as controlled (or directed) transformation of an indeterminatesituation into a unified whole(lw.12.108) as well as his view on the continuumof experience (lw.13.19). As forthe first question, I briefly reconstruct two senses of continuity: thatbetween inquiry and context as constituted by a traditionand a selective interest, among other elements (lw.6.12), and that between genesisand validity, following Dewey?sstance regarding the valid statusof the object of knowledge(mw.6.84). Considering this, I argue that non-epistemic values -or, at least, customary standards and valuations- have an initialinfluence when it comes to judging the indeterminatesituation as problematic and that this kind of values permeates the differentphases of the pattern of inquiry. As for the second question, Ireconstruct three new senses of continuity among science, valuation, and values. The first onerefers to a methodological level.Indeed, from a logical perspective there are no differences betweenscientific and valuejudgement for both are judgmentsof practice (mw.8; lw.13). The second refers to a material level. Proper valuation includes scientific judgment to project ends-in-view as accurate aspossible (lw.4.219) and, at the same time, scientific inquiry includes the analysis of thewidening non-scientific circle of consequences as an integralpart of its complete test (lw.12.484). The third refersto the continuity between means andends, so that sciencecannot be a neutral instrument dissociated from the value of its goals and consequences (lw.6.56; lw.13). Along withthis I recover both Anderson?s insight, according to which the value-free science ideal restson the assumption that values are science-free (2004), and Longino?s distinction between contextual and constitutive values (1983; 1990).Ultimately, I claimthat Dewey?s main contributions to the value-free science ideal debateare mainly three. Firstly, a naturalistic,cognitivist, and ?science-laden? conception of values. In this regard, valuesare not understood as dogmatic norsubjective but as the result of an intelligent deliberation. Moreover, they provide legitimate guidance to scientific inquiry without reductionism. Secondly, a broad idea of inquiry that includes the influence of context and the valuationof its wide consequences as part of the eulogistic sense of knowledge,what leads to taking social, moral and political values as constitutive elements of science. Andthirdly, a strong commitment to evaluating the ends of science, for its humanistic quality depends on them (mw.12.179).Finally, I suggest that Dewey offers solid philosophical grounds towards a political philosophy of science.