Federalism, two-level games and the politics of abortion rights implementation in subnational Argentina

ALBA MARÍA RUIBAL

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS (PRINT)

Taylor and Francis

Año: 2018

0968-8080

The implementation of the 2012 Argentinean Supreme Court landmark ruling on the F.,A.L case, which declared abortion legal in all cases of rape and established standards of implementation of lawful abortions by all levels of government, shows a disparate pattern of compliance by subnational governments throughout the country. Based on a case-study of implementation of the Court´s Decision in the province of Salta, this article advances an explanation of one of the mechanisms that can affect the definition and enforcement of abortion rights at the local level in a federation. Drawing on Putnam´s concept of two-level games, it argues that, in critical junctures, local authorities, and in particular strong governors with presidential aspirations, may have incentives to comply at least partially with national laws and judicial decisions which are contrary to their own ideological preferences and their local political allegiances, due to their electoral incentives at the national level. The study suggests that the analysis of political opportunities for local reproductive rights activists in federal regimes should include the potential two-level games of local authorities, including prominently politicians with presidential aspirations, but also judges who intend to pursue a career in national or international institutions. Through this analysis, the article intends to contribute to our understanding of the political determinants of compliance with national abortion laws and court decisions by subnational authorities in federal systems, and more generally, of the political factors and dynamics that shape inequities in women´s rights protection under federalism.