The Fundamental Problem of the Phenomenology of Time: The Phenomenologizing of Primal-Phenomenality in Husserl’s C-Manuscripts

LUIS NIEL

Estocolmo

Congreso; Annual Meeting of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology; 2010

Nordic Society for Phenomenology (NSOP)

The phenomenologizing of primal phenomenality—in other words, the methodical disclosure and thematizing of the lowest level of time constitution—is one the most fundamental problems of in Husserl's phenomenology of time. The paper concentrates on Husserl’s late C-Manuscripts, following this leading question: how is it possible at all to phenomenologically display the most fundamental level of experience, namely the pre-phenomenological constituting primal stream of consciousness? First, I will analyse the ‘status’ of the primal phenomenality (Urphänomenalität) of the primal stream (Urstrom) in its peculiar ‘intentionality’, by means of differentiating act-intentionality (the intentionality of acts) from stream-intentionality, as well as the act-constitution from the peculiar constitutive accomplishments of the stream itself. Second, I will outline the methodic function of the phenomenologizing ego as the highest form of phenomenological self-consciousness, the consciousness which discloses its own constitutive accomplishments. Third, I will address the most basic problem, namely the elusivenness of primal-phenomenality in its originality. The thematizing grasp of this primal-phenomenality can only be accomplished, I will argue, by putting this original experiencing in a objectifying intentional relationship with the phenomenologizing ego.